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RECENT CASES
ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW-ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT
STATEMENTSTHRESHOLD APPLICATION OF COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING UNDER NEPA

The Sierra Club and other organizations interested in protection
of the environment' brought suit in federal district court alleging
that the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture, along with the
Army Corps of Engineers, were violating the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 19692 in allowing coal development in the
Northern Great Plains region . The specific charge was that the
federal defendants4 had failed to prepare a detailed, comprehensive environmental impact statement for the region, a systematic interdisciplinary study of coal development, and a study of appropriate
alternative courses of action 5 prior to allowing development in the
four-state region. The plaintiffs prayed for declaratory relief from
the alleged violations, an injunction barring further federal action
in the region until compliance with NEPA's provisions, and an order
compelling the federal defendants to abide by NEPA's requirements.6 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum1. The Court of Appeals found that among the plaintiff organizations only the Northern
Plains Resource Council had standing to sue since no other plaintiff introduced any evidence on the issue of standing. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 869-70 n.20 (D.C. Cir.
1975). See text accompanying notes 37-40 infra.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NEPAl.
3. The states included within the Northern Great Plains region in issue were North
Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Wyoming. Brief for appellant at 33, Sierra Club v.
Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
4. Sixteen coal mining companies and utility companies joined with the Crow Tribe
of Indians to intervene after a showing of their respective interests In coal development.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
5. A pertinent part of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1970), provides:
[A]I agencies of the Federal Government shall(A)
utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will Insure the
Integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental
design arts in planning and in decision-making which may have an Impact
on man's environment;

6.

(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii)
any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv)
the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be impemented'.
Prior to make any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall
consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to the environmental impact
involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the apropriate Federal, State, and local agencies,, which are authorized to develop and
enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President,
the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing
agency review processes;
(D)
study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended
courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources.
In deciding whether or not an injunction should issue in NEPA cases, the harm to
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bia Circuit held that when the federal government attempts to "control development" of a definite region by using it power to approve
coal leases, mining plans, rights-of-way, and water option contracts,
it is -engaged in a comprehensive major federal action within the
meaning of NEPA, and therefore must prepare a comprehensive environmental impact statement.7 The court further noted that when
a federal agency chooses not to officially label its attempts at control of coal-related development a "plan" or a "program," it is
no bar to the agency's duty to prepare an environmental impact
statement for "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. . . ."S However, the court also held
that since the major federal action was merely "contemplated" by
the agencies, an order would issue simply compelling the federal defendants: to make the initial decision whether or not to prepare a
comprehensive environmental impact statement for the Northern
Great Plains and to provide a statement of reasons for the decition.9 Sierra Club v. Morton, 514-F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).10
Since NEPA became effective on January 1, 1970, it has been
the vehicle for a large volume of environmental litigation which has
sought to articulate the national demand for environmental protection."' Two of the earliest decisions gave the Act a very constricted
reading, under the mistaken belief that it created no judicially enforceable rights or duties in federal agencies. 1 2 However, the trend
established has been to interpret NEPA to require federal agencies
'1 3
to consider environmental values "to the fullest extent possible,'
rather than to allow them to consider only those values peculiar to
the agency's expertise.
To ensure that the broad substantive policies expressed in NEPA 4
be enjoined is sufficiently mature at the time an environmental impact statement becomes
necessary, but is not filed. Jones v. District of Col. Redev. Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 512
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
7. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
8. Id., citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (c) (1970), quoted at length in note 5 supra.
9. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 882 nn.38 & 40 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
10. Cert. granted sub nom. Frizzell v. Sierra Club, Inc., 44 U.S.L.W. 8389 (U.S. Jan. 12,
1976) (No. 75-552), cert. granted sub nom. American Elec. Power Sys. v. Sierra Club,
44 U.S.L.W. 3389 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1976) (No. 75-561).
11. For 'an overview of the demand for environmental legislation and a discussion of
the legislative history of NEPA, see F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 1-14 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as ANDERSON] ; 14. Yarrington, The National Environmental Policy Act,
4 B.N.A. ENVIRONMENT REPORTER MONOGRAPHs NO. 36 at 4-6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Yarrington]. See also ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 221-24 (Aug., 1972).

12. McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971); Buckleln v. Volpe, 2 E.R.C.
1082 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
13. Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). See also Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486
F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973) ; Environmental Def. Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th
Cir. 1972).
14. NEPA's 'substantive provisions, particularly 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331(a) & (b), represent
a challenge to courts interpreting them because the language speaks in terms of general
policy. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that:
The language of NEPA, as well as its legislative history, make it clear that
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are implemented by federal planners, certain action-forcing procedures were included by Congress.15 In particular, federal agencies
are required to "include a detailed evnironmental impact statement
in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislatilon and
other major federal actions ..

."I' To date, the courts have tended

to enforce and explain the procedural requirements, but the substantive meaning, while receiving a great deal of explanation, has
7
generally received a minimum of enforcement.1
The courts' preference for interpreting the procedural requirements derives from both the role of the courts as overseers of administrative agencies 5 and the relative ease of ruling upon procedural matters as questions of law. 9 When ruling upon questions of
fact which have been committed by statutes to agency expertise
and discretion, the judiciary i's
keenly aware of the limited review
20
power it may exercise.
The evidence in Sierra Club v. Morton showed that the Secretary
of the Interior had recognized the applicability of NEPA's environmental impact statement requirements to the region qua region, because he had initiated a number of studies of the Northern Great
Plains region, in addition to an inventory of coal resources. 21 One
2
study in particular, the Northern Great Plains Resource Program
was an effort to coordinate ongoing federal activities and to build a
policy which might guide future resources decisions by agencies
inthat area.22 In the Northern Great Plains Resource Program implementing order from the Secretary to his staff in the interior Department, the Secretary declared:
the Act Is more than an environmental full-disclosure law. NEPA was Intended to effect substantive changes in decision making. § 4331(b) of the
Act states that agencies have an obligation "to use all practical means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to Improve and
coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs and resources
to preserve and
enhance the environment". To this end, § 101 sets out specific environmental
goals to serve as a set of policies to guide agency action affecting the environment....
Environmental Def. Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972). For
further discussion of substantive duties imposed by NEPA upon the courts and agen"cies, see ANDERSON, supra note 11, at
258-65.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), quoted at length in note 5 supra. See also Yarrington, supra
note 11, at 4-6.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (c) (1970), quoted at length in note 5 supra.
17. See Robie, Recognition of Substantive Rights Under NEPA, 7 NATURAL RESOURCES
LAWYER 387 (1974); Yarrington, supra note 11, at 37-40; Note, Threshold Determinations
Under Section 102(2)(c) of NEPA, 16 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 107, 108 (1974). Compare
Environmental Def. Fund v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401, 1404 (D.D.C. 1971) with Environmental Def. Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972), In which
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that NEPA created substantive rights and Is
more than a full disclosure law.
18. I . DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT §§ 29.02, at 527, 30.03, at 548 (3Oded. 1972).
19. Id. § 30.03, at 548.
20. Id., see ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 258.
21. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 875-76 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
22. NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS RESOURCE PROGRAM, STAFF DRAFT REPORT (Washington,
D.C., and Denver, Colo., Sept. 27, 1974).
23. Id. at 1-4, I-5.
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The vast reserves of coal in the Fort Union region of Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming provide an
excellent opportunity for this Department to demonstrate how
a responsible Federal agency can manage resource development with proper regard for environmental protection. It is
important that we not lose this opportunity by engaging in
single-purpose studies which are incapable of developing comtaking piecemeal actions which
prehensive information or by
24
restrict our future options.
When the massive Draft Report of the Program was issued however, it contained the statement that "[t]he . . .coal development
profiles [within the Program] do not represent plans for development ..
"25 In comparing these statements, the court discerned an
inconsistency between the Interior Department's prior policy state26
ments and its later actions.
The Interior Department demonstrated further appreciation of
the practical effect that it continues to exert upon regional development when it proclaimed a coal leasing moratorium pending completion of a national environmental impact statement on proposed federal coal leasing policies.2 1 Notwithstanding the moratorium, some
federal activity in the Northern Great Plains continued, either
through loopholes in the Interior Department's policy or through the
exercise of other agencies' jurisdiction over national forests and navi28
gable rivers.
In a footnote before reaching the merits, the court readily dis29
posed of two preliminary defenses raised by the defendant agencies.
First, the rule that a NEPA challenge against an individual project presents a justiciable controversy only after final agency approval was found inappropirate in this case. The decision in Scientist's Institute for Public Information v. Atomic Energy Commission,31 upon which the court relied, held that a comprehensive program is itself a proper subject for challenge, regardless of whether
a program-related individual project has begun to significantly afSierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 863, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (emphasis added).
GREAT PLAINS RESOURCE PROGRAM, STAFF DRAFT REPORT, at I-5 (Sept. 27,
1974) (emphasis in original).
26. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
27. Id. at 863-64 (D.C. Cir. 1975). For a discussion of proposed amendments to the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-263 (1970), and' an argument by former
Speaker of the House John McCormick that coal gasification will better serve the national
economy by relying on Eastern and Central states' coal reserves, see 121 CONG. REC. 14564
(daily ed. July 31, 1975).
28. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 864 nn.8-10 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The court commended the federal defendants for the amount of restraint they had demonstrated In
allowing development up to that time, but expressed its alarm at the variety of available
leasing loopholes and the increasing pressure for private development to begin immediately
upon completion of the Northern Great Plains Resource Program Final Report. Id. at 866
& 883.
29. Id. at 868 n.20.
50. See, e.g., Comm. to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731 (D. Conn. 1972).
31. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
24.

25.
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fect the environment. 3 2 Similarly, in Sierra Club the plaintiffs were
held to have stated a case or controversy in alleging an irretrievable commitment of resources, a reasonable basis for treating such
commitments cumulatively, and a present requirement for filing a
comprehensive environmental impact statement. 3 Since NEPA expressly mandates preparation of an environmental impact statement where any irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources is about to occur,3 4 plaintiffs' claim was deemed clearly
within the Act. Additionally the ruling in Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission,35 that NEPA's en-

forcement is a matter of judical jurisdiction, taken in conjunction
with the Scientist's Institute decision that courts must intervene
sufficiently early to prevent improper consideration of cumulative
impacts,3 6 provided the grounds necessary for immediate review.
The question of standing was resolved through the court's application of the rather liberal criteria developed by the United States
Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton,3 the leading case on environmental plaintiffs' standing to sue. Under those criteria,,38 a
showing by one of the plaintiff organizations that it was composed
of residents from within a proposed mine site clearly demonstrated
that it would suffer at least minimal injury in fact if any member's
land was mined. 9 The plaintiffs' standing to sue was found to be
perfected since their immediate injury was within the zone of in40
terests which NEPA seeks to protect.
The threshold question posed by NEPA's impact statement requirement is: when does a major federal action exist for the purposes of the impact statement requirement?4 1 The case at bar is
S2. Id. at 1086-87.
33. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 869 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (c)(v) (1970), quoted at length in note 5 supra.
35. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). In this case the
court held that NEPA's procedural requirements were enforceable on the merits. By way
of dictum, the court expressed its view that the substantive provisions are enforceable
also. Id. at 1111 & 1115.
36. Scientist's Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1094 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
37. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).,See also United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) ; Scientist's Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1086 n.29 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
38. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738-40 (1972). The Court there held that aesthetic, conservational, recreational, and economic interests may each suffer an Injury sufficient to confer standing, but that the party in suit must itself suffer that injury. The
party's mere organizational interest is not sufficient, although once injury-in-fact is demonstrated the injured party may then assert the public's interest In support of its claim
for equitable relief. Id. at 738-40 n.15.
39. See notes 1 & 33 supra.
40. See Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54, 157 (1970). NEPA
seeks to protect each person's interest In a healthful environment by diffusing or preventing impacts from resource exploitation, population growth, and industrial expansion.
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) & (c) (1970).
41. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F,2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908; cf.
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974) ; Scherr v. Volpe,
466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972) ; Natural Res. Def. Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356, 367
(E.D.N.C. 1972).
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part of the attempt at judicial resolution of that question in the face
of federal agencies' prerogative to construct individual definitions of
the term. The initial judicial response to the federal agencies was
that an individual project could be "major," depending, for example, on the degree of federal expenditure of time, money, or effort
which it received.4 2 The second stage of response was that the cumulative effect of federal actions, individually too "minor" to require an impact statement, could cumulatively have an effect significant enough to amount to a major federal action, therefore triggering the requirement of a statement.4 3 The third response in the
progression was that the cumulative effect of a series of federal
actions which admittedly were individually major could require a
comprehensive environmental impact statement." The "comprehensive" criterion was added to the second and' third responses because
the cumulative effect itself had a significant impact which was distinct from those of the individual acts, and because that impact
would not receive consideration in the -statements prepared for individual actions. 45 Since the courts must implement consideration of
environmental values where the agencies fail to do so, the burden
.upon them is to ensure that foreseeable environmental impact is considered before a point of no return is reached in impractical, inex4 6
pedient use of our nation's resources.
The court in the present Sierra Club action looked to the prior
responses and viewed its threshold question to be whether its Scientist's Institute ruling should be extended to require a comprehensive environmental impact statement where the responsible federal
agency denies its involvement in an all inclusive program.4 7 The
court's view apparently places this case within the third level of responses to the broader threshold question of NEPA's application previously discussed.4 8 Scientist's Institute held that the impact statement requirement directly applies to a comprehensive program which
is admittedly a major federal action.49 In Scientist's Institute, the
42.

See Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); Monroe County Conservation

Council v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972).

43.

See Minnesota PIRG v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn. 1973) ; Enewetak v. Laird,

853 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 1973) ; Natural Res. Def. Council v. Grant, 341 F.
(E.D.N.C. 1972).

Supp. 356

44. Scientist's Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1973). See also Conservation Soc'y of S. Vermont v. Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927
(2nd Cir. 1974) ; Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973) ; Natural Res. Def. Council
V. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974).
45. See ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 290-92.

46, [T~he harm with which courts must be concerned- in NEPA cases is not,
strictly speaking, harm to the environment, but rather the failure of decisionmakers to take environmental facts into account in the way that NEPA mandates.
Jones v. Dist. of Col. Redev. Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
47.

Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

48.
49.

See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
481 F.2d 1079, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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defendant Atomic Energy Commission had been receiving a large
annual appropriation for its nuclear research and development program which was to site and construct a number of nuclear reactors.
The defendant Commission had also declared its intention to file an
environmental impact statement upon commencing construction of
each reactor, and thus had formally recognized NEPA's applicability. The court found that the large federal appropriation alone made
the program sufficiently major, and that the public controversy about
the potential risks surrounding nuclear reactors showed an imminent
significant effect. Since the cumulative overlap of any environmental
effects produced by the reactors was not to be considered in any
phase of the program, the court ordered the defendant agency to
file a comprehensive environmental impact statement as a condition
precedent to continuing its program. 50
The federal defendants in the case at bar had prepared impact
statements for a few individual projects within the Northern Great
Plains, 5' but unlike the defendant in Scientist's Institute, they denied
any involvement in a comprehensive regional program. This fact
prompted the court to expressly reserve the right to probe the substance of the agencies' denial.52 The court's reservation was made
with reliance upon Conservation Society of Southern Vermont, Inc.
v. Secretary of Transportation.53 In that case, the court held that
the present improvement of a twenty mile stretch of U.S. highway
within the State of Vermont was an irretrievable commitment of resources requiring preparation of a comprehensive impact statement.5 4 The court found that federal expectations were to eventually
convert the improved stretch into a two-hundred-eighty mile interstate highway, as annual federal funding became available. In Conservation Society, as in the case at bar, the federal defendants had
no present plan which set forth. the full program in its entirety. If
such a plan had been clearly present in either case, then the respective courts could have directly applied the impact statement requirement. 5" Instead, those courts found that portions of the de facto
50. Id.
51. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 865 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1975). One of the Impact
statements prepared by the federal agencies involved in the suit had actually included
comprehensive consideration of four mine sites and two railroad routes within the Eastern
Powder River Basin in northeastern Wyoming. The close geogrdphical proximity of the
six developments

and

their cumulative environmental impact was the apparent

constraint

In considering them at a somewhat regional level. Although this was not a point of contention on review, the federal agencies seem to have practically conceded the question at
issue: whether a regional impact merits regional assessment by means of NEPA's Impact
statement provision. Id.
62. Id. at 874.
53. 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974).
54.

Id.

at 935.

55. Both the Conservation Society and the Sierra Club courts took a hard look at the
facts presented to find that de facto programs existed. Were the programs formally declared, they would manifestly have been "major federal actions" causing "irreversible
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-program which were about to be undertaken were irretrievably
committing resources. Also, the agencies -involved expected the full
program itself to become a major federal action of significant effect.
Thus, the remaining threshold question was whether the time was
ripe for preparing the comprehensive statement for the program. In
Conservation Society, ripeness was sufficient because enough highway routing decisions had occurred so that a definite proposal for
major federal action existed within NEPA's meaning.56
The unique question of ripeness arising in the present case was
whether a court could require the filing of a comprehensive environmental impact statement "if it found that a comprehensive program should be under way. 5 , 7 The court first looked to the Guidelines of the Council on Envoronmental Quality5 8 in responding to this

question. As a part of its functions, the Council is specifically directed
to issue guidelines for preparation of impact statements by federal
agencies.5, The Guidelines have been interpreted to require a degree
of deference from the courts since the Council is charged with appraising agency compliance with NEPA and also because the Council's interpretation of compliance was issued soon after NEPA's
enactment.6 0 The fact that the Guidelines specified coal development as an example of cumulative impact upon a geographical region led the court to accept the plaintiff's theory that comprehensive planning should be required of the agencies where cumulatively
6
related effects are shown.

1

But the court's final position was that the practical problems, of
imposing a duty to plan comprehensively upon agencies would entangle the judiciary in the daily affairs of government and infringe
upon administrative discretion. The court thus held that it is for the
agencies to initially decide whether a comprehensive plan is required.
and Irretrievable commitments of resources," or, put differently, "major federal actions"
per se. In the context
of long-range programs such as those discussed above
. . . compliance with NEPA is necessary at stages at which significant resources are
being committed lest the statute's basic purpose be thwarted.
Scientist's Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1078, 1087 n.29 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
56. Conservation Soc'y of S. Vermont v. Secretary of Trans., 508 F.2d 927, 935 (2d Cir.
1974).
57. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (emphasis by the court).
58. Exec. Order No. 11,514, § 3(h), 3 C.F.R. 902 (1966-70 Comp.), 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1970). For the full text of the Guidelines, see 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1974). The Council on
Environmental Quality was created by Title II of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1970). Its
basic responsibility is to review and appraise agency compliance with NEPA. Id. at §
4344(3).
59. Id.
60. The doctrine of judicial deference to administrative interpretation Is enhanced In
this instance since Congress designated this particular agency, The Council of Environmental Quality, to promote the statute's efficiency, and also because the Council was probably informed directly of the Congressional intent at the time the duty was created. See
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) ; Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union
of Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961).
61. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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It stated that "the agencies . . . are supposed to organize the various
federal projects throughout the country, not litigants ....,,82
The role

of the court was ostensibly limited to deciding whether an agency
must file a regional environmental impact statement for a comprehensive plan which is in actual operation.6 3
The court's reluctance to intrude upon administrative jurisdiction was tempered by its firm rejection of complete agency di'scretion in deciding when an action is a "program. ' ' 64 This prompted
the court to leave open the possibility of imposing a duty to plan
comprehensively upon the agencies. 65 The power to require systematic, interdisciplinary studies would allow the courts to reach administrator's decisions during their formulation at the highest policy level. Such a power would thereby enable enforcement of environmental consideration to the fullest extent possible and greatly
strengthen NEPA's substantive sections. 6
The overwhelming amount of federal time and effort which was
expended to produce a regional treatment of coal development in the
Northern Great Plains compelled the court to conclude that the resulting "proposal" for regional development would require the present filing of a comprehensive -impact statement.6 8 The court then
applied a balancing test for ripeness which it had developed in Scientist's Institute,6 9 but found the test inconclusive because of the federal defendants' failure to define their long-term position in allowing
development.
Thie inconclusive result of the test is due principally to the fact
that the defendants acted inconsistently toward the Northern Great
Plains Region, and leaves the test's usefulness somewhat jeopar62. Id. at 875.
63. For a thorough discussion of "action" as a definitional tool which would trigger the
Impact statement requirement, thereby decreasing the uncertainty in timing and scope of
the statement, see Comment, Planning Level and Program Impact Statements Under the
National Environmdntal Policy Act: A Definitional Approach, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 124
(1975).
64. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The court specified six
circuits holding that Injunctive relief is a proper remedy for substantive violations of
NEPA. Id. at 874 n.25.
65. Id. at 874.
66. For discussion of administrative decision-making generally and as applied to NEPA,
see ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 246-74; Cramton & Berg, On Leading a Horse to Water:
NEPA and the Federal Bureaucracy, 71 Mica. L. REv. 511 (1973) ; Comment, NEPA Applied to Policy-Level Decisionmaking, 3 ECOL. L.Q. 799 (1974).
67. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
68. Id. at 875.
69. 481 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir. 1972). The agency, or the reviewing court, should inquire
as follows:
How likely Is the program to come to fruition, and how soon will that occur?
To what extent is meaningful information available on the efects of implementation of the program, and of alternatives and their effects?
To what extent are irretrievable commitments being made and options precluded as refinement of the proposal progresses?
How severe will be the environmental effects if the program is Implemented?
Id. at 880.
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dized. 70 The court found that meaningful information on the effects
of coal development and the alternatives to such development would
be available for consideration in a comprehensive statement. 71 Also,
it found that the environmental effects from coal development will
clearly be severe because "a region isolated from urban America,
sparsely populated and virtually unindustrialized will be converted
into a major industrial complex. ' ' 72 The further findings that the
federal government would probably approve development in the near
future, but that it was substantially avoiding irretrievable commitments of coal and water until such approval, left the court with
73
mixed inclinations toward the ripeness issue.
Although the court found that the time was not yet ripe for a
comprehensive impact statement for coal development in the Northern Great Plains region, it did find that the federal defendants would
be free to approve further development in the region upon completion of the Northern Great Plains Resource Program Final Report.7 4
The court then correlated the agencies' freedom of action with a
duty to decide what their respecti've roles would be in relation to
NEPA. In so doing, it reinforced the degree of good faith compliance with NEPA's procedure which the federal defendants had exhibited through the leasing moratorium and the Northern Great Plains
Resource Program. To bolster further compilance, the court con70. See Comment, supra note 63, at 152. The author there states that the criteria borrowed from Scientist's Institute merely invites bureaucratic obfuscation by allowing the
agencies to define their own role. But, the point made is that the federal duty to administer federal lands will Inevitably require the agencies to respond to increasing development pressures by preparing a comprehensive plan as a result of systematic interdisciplinary
studies mandated by NEPA. Id.
71. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The Interior Department
through Its Northern Great Plains Resource Program had, stated:
Considerable uncertainty remains regarding the impacts of coal development
In the Northern Great Plains. It is extremely difficult to estimate or assess
cumulative Impacts. However, these impacts may be critical. Is the impact
of two mines or power plants in the same area twice as great as the Impact of one, or Is It larger?
NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS RESOURCE PROGRAM, STAFF DRAFT REPORT at V-2 (Sept. 27, 1974).
Despite the seeming lack of answers to its questions in regard to air quality impacts the Interior Department was already aware from its own previous North Central
Powers Study, that:
Once the proposed coal-burning power plants begin operation at their enormous generating capacity, the region's air-quality-now almost pure and
containing little industrial pollution-will be seriously degraded. Based on an
operating capacity of only 53,000 megawatts-which may be only a portion
of their ultimate capacity-and upon full compliance with the New Stationary
Source Emission Standards of the Environmental Protection Agency, these
plans will produce annual emissions of 2,730,000 tons of sulfur oxides,
1,879,000 tons of nitrogen oxides and 94,500 tons of particulates (fly ash).
These amounts represent approximately four times the present combined
emissions of New York City and Los Angeles....
Brief for Appellants at 151-6, Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975), citing
North Central Power Study, City of New York Air Resources Department, and County of
Los Angeles Air Pollution Control District.
72. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
73. Id. at 881.
74. Id.
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tinued the limited temporary injunction it had earlier issued."5 Injunctive relief, the court noted, would preserve the status quo in that
portion of the region most immediately subject to irretrievable commitment of its resources.
Sierra Club v. Morton is potentially a trend-setting case for a
number of reasons. Because of its broad application to inter-agency
actions which are linked either programatically, geographically, or
environmentally, the Sierra Club ruling may exert significant constraint upon such actions at the highest policy-making levels. The
ruling should implement systematic, inter-disciplinary studies of cumulative impacts among agencies regardless of whether an agency
has originated an individual plan in the secullsion of its own bureaucracy. In the context of this case, a comprehensive environmental
impact statement should embrace the Northern Great Plains, and
should focus upon leasing, mining, rights-of-way, and water rights
in order to confront decision-makers with the full range of impacts
and alternatives. Such a confrontation is clearly needed to prevent
the easy, but fatally myopic, answers proposed in response to a
questionable energy crisis. 7G Ultimately, if a particular mine site is
chosen by this process, it should yield a long-term net benefit to the
region and to the nation, not merely the immediate landowner or
municipality. Such a choice will go far toward implementing NEPA's
substantive meaning and the most environmentally sound development of natural resources.
GREG HENNESSY

Id. at 883.
In the field of electric utilities, the Environmental Protection Agency allows
those utilities to find low sulfur coal and then use no sulphur oxide scrubbing
devices to take the remaining sulphur out of the coal. And the result is that
utilities all over the country . . . are going to Montana and Wyoming to find
low sulphur coal so that they will not have to use technology to take out sulphur from coal as they must when using a higher sulphur-content coal.
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